Faith and Law.
Since “A religious error is the main root of all social and political evils”, I define below the religious error that the Catholic Church has bought into hook, line and sinker for 49 years now merely because the U.S. Supreme Court hid it as a matter of law – although visible, unnoticed by anyone - its judicial lie, solely based on this religious error, follows:
THE RELIGIOUS ERROR
DEFINED:
A religiously offensive coercion to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle, only [defined as never in practice]
is just as religiously offensive as
both religiously offensive coercions to (1) violate religion in practice, and (2) consent to an
always-available temptation to violate religion in
practice.
By observation, a Prolife Catholic coerced to join a group health insurance [GHI] plan which includes coverage for abortion, contraception and sterilization is, by identity, coerced to, as above indicated: (1) violate religion in practice [by paying that portion of the Employee’s Share of GHI plan premiums which are used to pay for abortion, contraception and sterilization] and (2) consent to an always-available temptation to violate religion in practice [if not for him/herself[1], then also to tempt other GHI plan members, thereby cooperating with intrinsically evil practices formally by making this coverage in question available to them], as well. In 2004, the California Supreme Court[2] coerced the Catholic Church to either sponsor contraception in all GHI plans, offered to all its employees who work at Catholic Hospitals and Catholic Charities, or else, be punished for not doing so by being denied the opportunity to offer any GHI plans at all. Yet in 2004 the Bishops caved in. Yet again in 2007 the U. S. Conference of Catholic Bishops caved in by adopting that policy as their own also. In 2010 the Government defined the term “contraception” to include abortifacients as well.Yet Sherbert v. Verner, pursuant to federal law, no less, upon which that 2004 California ruling was exclusively based was designed by the U. S. Supreme Court to judicially resolve only a set of facts and circumstances which in reality placed the religious adherent in question, Mrs. Sherbert, in the religiously offensive condition to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion “in principle, only”, which again means never in practice, as opposed to the two religiously offensive coercions which I above designated as (1) and (2) which are both coercions “in practice”, not “in principle, only”.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Sherbert
and Thomas v. Review Board created an accommodation
test - the latter affirming the former case law – whereby, with that specific coercion in question the Government was entitled to step in by consequently creating an inroad on religious freedom,yet only by demonstrating to the Court beforehand that its doing so served the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. However to the contrary, unless the Government was permitted to do so, a religious adherent must enjoy all the full religious freedom in question, as in fact was the case with Mrs. Sherbert. However in Sherbert and Thomas, the religious error was planted by pretending to include facts and circumstances that allegedly pertained to Mrs. Sherbert’s situation, but however it did not. This brought about the present judicial denial of religious freedom, such as we have today, as follows: "The ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith [emphasis, added]."[3] As a result all lawyers, judges, Catholic Clerics and/or Faithful, and all others read that above passage which indicated the clear interpretation that what caused Mrs. Sherbert to raise her type of burden on the free exercise of religion in the first place occurred solely when the State disqualified Mr. Sherbert from Unemployment Compensation Benefits only when she refused to violate her religion in practice. But to the contrary that statement is its own refutation. Here’s why:
In order to qualify for Unemployment Compensation Benefits, Mrs. Sherbert was asked whether she was ready, willing and able to accept the possibility of talking a job – in case a job was ever offered to her, that is which would require her to work also on Saturdays in violation of her faith as a Seventh Day Adventist [who regard Saturdays as their day of sabbath]. Yet when she answered, “No”, she became disqualified to receive the benefits in question. But according to the facts and circumstances, Mrs. Sherbert was coerced to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle, only. Why "in principle only"? Because had she only agreed to do so, Mrs. Sherbert would have received weekly checks for Unemployment Compensation Benefits until offered to take a job which might include a Saturday workday. Nevertheless, she would never be coerced to take any job which required her to violate her religion in practice since the State had ruled beforehand that she was “fired without good cause”. To the contrary, then, the truth is that this in reality otherwise qualified her for the benefits in question “because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith” (as cited above). Consequently, this ambiguity conceals the Court’s true possibility to allow a Governmental imposition on religious liberty in some cases, while pretending to allow the Government to usurp religious liberty in cases (1) and (2), above, pursuant to the underlined passage above in Thomas. On the other hand, the religious error behind the HHS mandate - by identity the judicial lie in Sherbert - was prophetically refuted in Evangelium vitae by His Holiness Pope John Paul II at ¶73 and ¶74, as follows:
In order to qualify for Unemployment Compensation Benefits, Mrs. Sherbert was asked whether she was ready, willing and able to accept the possibility of talking a job – in case a job was ever offered to her, that is which would require her to work also on Saturdays in violation of her faith as a Seventh Day Adventist [who regard Saturdays as their day of sabbath]. Yet when she answered, “No”, she became disqualified to receive the benefits in question. But according to the facts and circumstances, Mrs. Sherbert was coerced to consent to a proposed temptation to violate religion in principle, only. Why "in principle only"? Because had she only agreed to do so, Mrs. Sherbert would have received weekly checks for Unemployment Compensation Benefits until offered to take a job which might include a Saturday workday. Nevertheless, she would never be coerced to take any job which required her to violate her religion in practice since the State had ruled beforehand that she was “fired without good cause”. To the contrary, then, the truth is that this in reality otherwise qualified her for the benefits in question “because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith” (as cited above). Consequently, this ambiguity conceals the Court’s true possibility to allow a Governmental imposition on religious liberty in some cases, while pretending to allow the Government to usurp religious liberty in cases (1) and (2), above, pursuant to the underlined passage above in Thomas. On the other hand, the religious error behind the HHS mandate - by identity the judicial lie in Sherbert - was prophetically refuted in Evangelium vitae by His Holiness Pope John Paul II at ¶73 and ¶74, as follows:
“¶73…. There is
no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave and
clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection. From the very
beginnings of the Church, the apostolic preaching reminded Christians of their
duty to obey legitimately constituted public authorities (cf. Rom 13:1-7; 1 Pet
2:13-14), but at the same time it firmly warned that ‘we must obey God rather
than men’ (Acts 5:29). In the Old Testament, precisely in regard to threats
against life, we find a significant example of resistance to the unjust command
of those in authority. After Pharaoh ordered the killing of all newborn males,
the Hebrew midwives refused. ‘They did not do as the king of Egypt commanded
them, but let the male children live’ (Ex 1:17). But the ultimate reason for
their action should be noted: ‘the midwives feared God’ (ibid.). It is
precisely from obedience to God – to whom alone is due that fear which is
acknowledgment of his absolute sovereignty-that the strength and the courage to
resist unjust human laws are born. It is the strength and the courage of those
prepared even to be imprisoned or put to the sword, in the certainty that this
is what makes for ‘the endurance and faith of the saints’ (Rev 13:10). In the case of an
intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it
is therefore never licit to obey it, or to ‘take part in a propaganda campaign
in favour of such a law, or vote for it’ (emphasis, added).
¶74. The passing of unjust
laws often raises difficult problems of conscience for morally upright people with regard to the
issue of cooperation, since they have a right to demand not to be forced to take part in morally
evil actions [emphasis, added]. Sometimes the choices which have to be made
are difficult; they may require the sacrifice of prestigious professional
positions or the relinquishing of reasonable hopes of career advancement….. In order to shed light on
this difficult question, it is necessary to recall the general principles
concerning cooperation in evil actions. Christians, like all people of good will, are called upon under
grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally in practices, which
even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God’s law. Indeed, from a moral
standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate formally in evil [emphasis, added]. Such cooperation occurs
when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete
situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an act against innocent
human life or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing it.
This cooperation can never be justified either by invoking respect for the
freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that civil law permits it or
requires it. Each individual in fact has moral responsibility for the acts
which he personally performs; no one can be exempted from this responsibility,
and on the basis of it everyone will be judged by God himself (cf. Rom 2:6; 14:12). To
refuse to take part in committing an injustice is
not only a moral duty; it is also a basic human right
[emphasis, added]. Were this not so,
the human person would be forced to perform an action intrinsically incompatible with human dignity, and
in this way human freedom itself, the authentic meaning and purpose of which
are found in its orientation to the true and the good, would be radically
compromised. What is at stake therefore is an essential right which, precisely,
as such, should be acknowledged and protected by civil law. In this sense, the
opportunity to refuse to take part in the phases of consultation, preparation
and execution of these acts against life should be guaranteed to physicians,
health-care personnel, and directors of hospitals, clinics and convalescent
facilities. Those who have recourse to conscientious objection must be
protected not only from legal penalties but also from any negative effects on
the legal, disciplinary, financial and professional plane.
‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’ (Luke 10:27): ‘promote life’.”
‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’ (Luke 10:27): ‘promote life’.”
PRO-LIFERS' TAX STRIKE
MAY BE LEGITIMIZED
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ENDNOTES:
[1] Note: Even assuming arguendo, here, the religious adherent is indeed strong enough to withstand the temptation in question, nevertheless he or she is still sinning from pride, known as the sin of presumption - i.e., by believing he or she will be saved by "his/her own efforts" without "God's help" or visa versa - which sin filters into their consciences in unsuspecting ways, especially in view that abortion and/or contraception are intrinsically evil practices.
[2] The California Supreme Court agreed with a lower court decision that the state's Women's Contraception Equity Act (WCEA) requires employers who provide prescription drug benefits in their health care insurance plans to include prescription contraception coverage. Catholic Charities of Sacramento challenged the constitutionality of the provision, specifically with regard to its right to the free exercise of religion. The court held that Catholic Charities was not entitled to an exemption as it did not meet the criteria of a "religious employer" as delineated in WCEA. Furthermore, WCEA "served a compelling state interest [emphasis, added] in the elimination of ... gender discrimination in the provision of health benefits"; had a "secular legislative purpose"; was valid and neutral; and neither advanced or inhibited religion. The California Supreme Court concluded as decisive its decision to do so as: “We therefore review Catholic
Charities’ challenge to the WCEA under the free exercise clause of the
California Constitution in the same way we might have reviewed a similar
challenge under the federal (emphasis, added) Constitution after Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S.
398, and before Smith, supra, ….”, Catholic Charities of Sacramento,
Inc. v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Dept. of Managed Health Care
et al, Real Parties in interest, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67, 91, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283, at 311-2; 32
Cal. 4th 527, at 562 (S.Ct.Ca. March 1, 2004).
[3]Thomas v. Review Board, supra, 716-717, by observation, thereby affirming, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). | ||||
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